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ln tl1e ~tlprcrlle Cot1r·t <)f the 
State of Utal1 
WIUIA W. WOOTTON, ;· 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF AMERICA, ) 
~Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10108 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, as beneficiary of a life 
insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of her 
deceased husband, which action defendant resists on the 
grounds that it was fraudulently induced to enter into said 
insurance contract by the misrepresentations of plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of 
plaintiff \Vas granted by the court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment entered and 
that the case :be remanded to the lower court for trial 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 24th day of September, 1962, plain-
tiff executed an Application for Hospital or Medical-Sur-
gical Policy for and on behalf of Harold Wootton and her-
self. Said application included an application for an Acci-
dental Death Rider in the principal sum of $5,000.00, cov-
ering .the life of HaroJd Wootton only. (Exhibit 1 in dep-
osition of Wilma W. Wootton) The •application was taken. 
' . 
by Leo Albert Bowen, ·an insurance agent, who was a long-
time friend of plaintiff and her deceased husband. (Dep-
osition of Leo Albert Bowen, P. 3) Mr. Bowen asked the 
questions which appear on the application and the answers 
were written in his handwriting. (Bowen Dep., p. 7) The 
answers were written by him just as they were given by 
plaintiff. (Bowen Dep., p. 9) Certain questions were 
asked concerning the physical condition of the parties pro-
posed to be insured, and the answers given by paintiff were 
written on the application. (Items 5, 6, and 7 of the ap-
piication) The application was examined by plaintiff after 
it was completed and before it was signed. (Deposition of 
Wilma W. Wootton, P. 12) It was then signed by plain· 
tiff as ''Mrs. Harold Wootton''. (Application and Wootton 
Dep., p. 11) The completed application was forwarded 
to defendant, Combined Insurance Company of America, 
and }n. reliance thereon an insurance policy was issued, the 
same being dated September 24, 1962, to coincide with the 
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date on \vhich the application was signed. (A copy of said 
insurance policy is included in the record) Subsequently, 
on the third day of December, 1962, Harold Wootton died 
as a rPsttlt of injurie3 sustained in an automobile-pedestrian 
accident. Plaintiff made demand upon the defendant for 
the payment of the principal sum of $5,000.00 provided for 
in the Accidental Death Rider. (Plaintiff's complaint) De-
fendant declined to pay said claim, on the grounds that it 
was induced to enter into the said insurance contract by 
reason of intentional misrepresentation of material facts 
and contending further that had defendant been informed 
of the true physical condition of plaintiff's deceased hus-
band, defendant would not have entered into said insurance 
contract. (Defendant's Answer) The misrepresentations 
clahned by defendant are based on plaintiff's answers to 
questions five, six and seven in the application,. specifically 
with respect to the physical condition of Harold Wootton. 
The specific nature of the misrepresentations was later set 
forth in Answers to Interrogatories which are a part of . 
the record. A Motion for Swnmary Judgment was filed by 
plaintiff, based on the pleadings, depositions, interroga-
tories and an affidavit of plaintiff. By stipulation of coun-
sel. the depositions of Leo Albert Bowen and Wilma W. 
\rootton were published in total at the time of the argu-
ment of the Motion for Summary Judgment. From a de-
cision granting said Motion, defendant appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE RECORD DISCLOSES GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THESE CONDITIO·NS 
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THE GRANTING OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER. 
POINT IT 
THE PHYSICAL CO·NDiTION AND MEJD[CAL HIS-
TORY OF AN APPLICANT FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
ARE MATTERS MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED 
BY THE INSURER, AND MISREPRESENTATIONS AS 
TO. SUCH MATTERS FORM THE BASIS FOR AVOID-
ANCE OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT INDUCED BY 
SUCH! MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD DISCLOSES GENUINE ISSUES O·F 
MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THESE CONDITIONS 
THE GRANTING O·F A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER. 
As has been stated by this Court on many occasions, 
a summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If there is 
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion should 
be denied. (In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83~ 348 
P2d 683; Young vs. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P2d 862) 
Both in the lower court and on appellate review, the 
party against whom the summary judgment is granted is 
entitled ·to the benefit of having the court consider all of 
the facts p~resented and every inference fairly arising there-
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from in a light most favorable to him. (Morris vs. Farns-
worth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297). This Court 
has recently reiterated this pr()position in the case of Kid-
man vs. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P2d 898, in the fol-
lowing language: 
.. . . . a summary judgment, which turns a party out 
of court without an opportunity to present his evi-
dence, is a harsh measure that shoud be granted only 
when, taking the view most favorable to a party's 
claims, and any proof that might properly be adduced 
thereunder, he could in no event prevail." 
Based on these criteria, defendant respectfully con-
tends that the record which was before the trial court and 
is now before this Court, amply discloses that there are 
genuine issues of material fact whi·ch can only properly 
be resolved upon a trial of this matter on its merits. 
Such issues of material fact concern the question of whether 
plaintiff intentionally misrepresented the physical condi-
tion of her husband, Harold Wootton, in the application 
for insurance. An examination of her answers to ques-
tions five, six and seven on said application diseloSe that 
she revealed that Hlarold Wootton had polio at the age of 
three, that he had a slight limp resulting therefrom, that 
he had completely recovered from said condition and had 
had no recurrences, and that he was now in good health 
and free from any physical defect, injury or disease, ·and 
\Vas not no\v under medical care. 
When plaintiff's deposition was taken, she was asked 
if she had signed a written report of an interview which 
she had with a Mr. Gibson on January 9, 1963. She ad-
mitted that the report bore her signature, and did not 
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deny that she read it before signing it. The statement 
which she signed concerned the death of her husband, 
Harold Wootton, and was as follows: 
"On 12/3/62 he walked out of cafe, crossing the road 
to pick up his car, and was hit by a car. The driver 
said he never even saw my husband until too late. He 
said he just saw a shadow and didn't even know what 
·he hit. My husband's correct date of birth is 1/16/07, 
and he was employed as plant operator for the Provo 
River WateT Users until 7/15/62, \\"hen he retired, go-
ing on aid for disabled due to his polio. lie was ad-
vised to retire by Dr. Smith, Provo, Utah, and I un-
dersrfa.nd he said my husband might lose the use of 
his good leg if he didn't stay off of it." (Emphasis 
ours) (Wootton Depos., P. 18 and 19.) 
In the same deposition, plaintiff stated that she mar-
ried Harold Wootton in 1951 (Wootton Dep., P. 5) and that 
his condition remained the same from the time of said mar-
riage until the time of the death of Harold Wootton. (Woot-
ton Dep., P. 17) Also, that there was no substantial 
change in the condition of Harold Wootton from Septem-
ber 24, the date on which the application was signed, to 
December 3, the date of his death. {Wootton IDep., P. 16) 
With that foundation as to the physical condition of 
Harold Wootton, the following exchange of questions and 
answe~rs appears on Page 20 of the said deposition: 
"Now, Wilma, on November 27, 1962, Harold filed 
an application ·with the Social Security Administration 
claiming to be completely and totally disabled, did he 
not? 
A. I don't know . 
· Q. You mean to say that you had no knowledge 
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of that application, if there was such an application 
made? 
A. I don't say I don't have no knowledge of it. 
\Vhat I am saying is that the last five years I have 
lJe('\n under an emotional strain and things don't come 
back clear to me. And Harold's death never done it 
any good either, even then. I have been under Dubois 
until I couldn't afford it any longer. 
Q. So \Vhat you are saying is you don't remem-
ber this at this time, but you might have known it at 
the time? 
A. I might have known it at the time ... " 
If in fact the condition of Harold Wootton had not 
changed from September 24, 1962, to the date of his death, 
and if in fact he, with the knowledge of the plaintiff, filed 
an application on November 27, 1962, claiming to be. com-
pletely and totally disabled, it would seem to follow, as the 
night the day, that he could not have been in "good health 
and free from any physical defect, injury or disease" as 
represented by plaintiff at the time of ·the signing of the 
application on September 24, 1962. 
Again, referring to the physical condition of Harold 
\Vootton, the following appears on Pages 13 and 14 of the 
deposition of Wilma W. Wootton: 
"Q. When did Harold tenninate his employ.ment 
with the Provo River Water Users 
A. I think it was July 15. 
Q. \Vhy did he terminate? 
A. Well I don't exactly lmow why he terminated, 
other than the change-over on the job up there. The 
job was too much for him . . . 
Q. Did you discuss why the job was too much 
for him? 
A. Yes. When he first went up there he had 
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control over the powerhouse. That is all he had to 
do. And then they put him in charge of the chlorinat-
ing station and house cleaning and cutting the lawns. 
And in his condition he couldn't hold his end up. 
Q. You say "in his condition". What was there 
about his condition? 
A. This condition existed then. 
Q. What condition? 
A. The polio. He had restricted work that he 
:could do. He ·could not he on his legs all day. 
Q. Isn't it true, Mrs. Wootton, that for about 
a year or two prior to the time that he terminated 
that he had been having a lot of trouble with falling? 
A .. H·arold had trouble with falling all his life." 
Again referring to Item 7 of tile application, we fail 
to see how a person who ''had trouble with falling all his 
life'' could be ''free from any physical defect, injury or 
disease'' especially if such falling were caused by residuary 
muscle weakness as a result of polio. 
It is of. extreme sgnifican~ce that the statements made 
to the agent who completed the application concerning the 
condition of Harold Wootton were markedly different from 
the statements made by plaintiff in her deposition. In 
this connection, the following appears on Page 14 of the 
deposition orf .Leo Albert Bowen: 
"Q. (By Mr. Paulson) If I understand you cor· 
rectly, Mrs. Wootton told you in substance that her 
husband had had polio when he was three years old; 
that he now had a limp which you already knew, but 
that limp wasn't causing him any particular problem 
at ·the time this application was taken. 
· A. · That is right.· 
Q. Is this correct? 
A. Yes." 
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We have quoted at some length from the depositions 
primarily tor the purpose of showing that even the plain-
tiffs o\vn testimony, when compared with the representa-
tions n1ade in the application, indicates some material mis-
representations of the physical condition of Harold Wootton 
at the time the application was signed by plaintiff. This 
comparison of the depositions with the application, supple-
Inented by the balance of the recol-d, and viewed in a light 
most favorable to defendant clearly indicates that there 
are genuine issues as to material facts ·here·in which issues 
can only be properly resolved by a trial of this matter on 
its merits. 
PO~INT II 
THE PHYSICAL CONDITION AND MEI)ICAL HIS-
TORY OF AN APPLICANT' FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
ARE l\1A TTERS MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED 
BY THE INSURER, A.J."'\!D MISREPRESE·N'rATIONS AS 
TO SUCH MATTERS FORM THE BASIS FOR AVOID-
ANCE OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT IND,UCED BY 
SUCH MISREPRESENTATIONS. 
The law is well established that the health of an appli-
cant for insurance on his life, health or bodily condition 
is of vital importance to the insurer, and questions to elicit 
information on the subject and in regard to illnesses and 
ailn1ents of such person are proper to be asked and should 
be truthfully answered. The general rule with respect to 
the effect of an untrue statement concerning these matters 
is stated as follows: 
''The rule is unanimous that an untrue statement in re-
gard to a material matter affecting the health or phys .. 
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ioal condition of an applicant for life insurance, who 
knows the statement to be untrue, will allow the in-
surer to avoid the policy . '' (29 Am. Jur., Insur-
ance, Sec. 7 42, P. 999) 
This general rule is implicitly recognized in this State 
by the presence of the following statutory provision in our 
Insurance Code: 
31-19-8. "Materiality of misrepresentations - War-
ranties - Presumptions and burden of proof. - (1) Ex-
cept as provided in subsection (2) , no oral or written 
misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotia-
tion of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his 
behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid 
the contract or prevent it attaching, unless such mis-
representation· or warranty is made with the intent to 
deceive. 
The insured shall have the burden of proof that 
such misrepresentation or warranty was not made with 
intent to deceive. 
(2) In ·any application for life or disability in-
surance made in writing by the insured, all statements 
therein made· by the insured shall, in the absence of 
fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties. 
· The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the 
right to recovery under ·the contract unless it mate-
rially affected ei·ther the acceptance of the risk or the 
hazard assumed by the insurer.'' (This provision was 
amended in 1963, but the language quoted herein was 
the statute as it existed at the time of the signing of 
the application in this case.) 
Tvvo questions are suggested by the statute in its ap-
plication to the case at bar, i.e., the question of materiality 
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o1 the misrepresentations and the question of intent. These 
will be discussed in that order. 
Many courts in many jurisdictions have attempted to 
d~\finc the rnateriality of representations made to induce 
the issuance of an insurance contract. Without multiply-
ing cases, it would appear that the definition of this Court 
in Fidelity & Casualty Company vs. Middlemiss, 103 Utah 
429, 135 P2d 275 is as complete as any we have examined. 
Therein, the Court said: 
"A material representation is one which ordinarily would 
influence the prudent insurer in determining whether 
to accept or reject a risk, or in fixing the amount of 
the premium in the event of such acceptance, or in 
excepting some risk or part thereof from coverage . . . 
a material fact is any fact, the knowledge or ignorance 
of whi~h would naturally influence the insurer's judg-
ment in making the contract, in estimating the degree 
and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of in-
suranc-e.'' 
The same general principle has been stated by the 
Dela\vare court in Prudential Insurance Company of Amer-
ica vs. Gutowski, 113 A2d 579, as follows: 
''And a condition or disease is sufficiently serious to 
justify the Court in finding it material to the risk if it 
would naturally have persuasive influence upon the 
insur~r's determination with respect to undertaking 
an insurance contract.'' 
It should be abundantly clear that the facts concern-
ing the physical condition of Harold Wootton would have 
naturally influenced the judgment of the defendant . in the 
case at bar as to whether an accidental death insurance 
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policy should be issu~ by said defendant. It is the con-
tention of defendant that had it been apprised orf the facts 
that Mr. Wootton "had trouble with falling all his life", had 
terminated his employment on the advice of a physician, 
had gone "on aid for disabled due to his polio" and was in 
such condition fuat he made an application with the Social 
Security Administration for total disability benefits, that said 
defendant, as stated in its Answer to the COmplaint orf plain-
tiff, "would not ·have entered into said insurance contract 
wi1Jh said decedent and plaintiff." 
With respect to the question of an intent to deceive 
as referred to in Title 31-19-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Supra, it was stated in Prudential Insurance Company of 
America vs. Willsey, 10 Cir. 1954, 214 F2d 729: 
"Therefore it seems that Utah is firmly committed to 
the rule that no misrepresentations or warranties made 
in the negotiation of an insurance contract shall de-
feat or avoid that contract unless such representations 
are made with an intent to deceive." 
This conclusion was reached in the case cited above as 
a result of an analysis of several previous cases, concluding 
with New York Life Insurance Company vs. Grow, 103 Utah 
285, 135 P2d 120. In those cases (all decided prior to 
1947) it had been uniformly ·held that in order to avoid 
an insurance contract, the insurer must prove that mate-
rial misrepresentations were made with an intent to de-
ceive. The insurer had the burden of proof on all of those 
issues. This was stated by the court in New York Life 
Insurance Company vs. Grow, Supra, as follows: 
"It was the burden of plaintiff to establish actual fraud 
on the part of the insured, that he made the material 
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misn~presentations shown by the application knowingly 
and \Vith intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff 
insurance company.'' 
A very significant change in the law occurred when 
in 1947 the legislature of Utah passed the statute cited as 
Title 31-19-8, Supra, which contained the following provi-
sion: 
"The insured shall have the burden of proof that such 
misrepresentation or warranty was not made with in-
tent to deceive." (Emphasis ours) 
This statutory change in the law with respect to the 
burden of proving intent or lack of intent to deceive becomes 
:nore significant in light of a recent decision of the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. In the case 
of Castagno vs. Occidental Life Insurance Company of Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, D. C. Utah, 151 F. Supp. 781, a case 
similar to the case at bar in that a plaintiff was suing on 
a life insurance policy and the defense was a claimed mis-
representation, the court states the following, pertaining 
to the matter of intent: 
"There is a presumption of intent to deceive from the 
knowing concealment of material facts, unless such 
presumption is overthrown by substantial evidence." 
(Citing Zolintakis vs. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety of the United States, 10 Cir. 1938, 97 F2d 583, 
See also Id., 10 Cir., 108 F2d 902.) 
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the record, 
viev.'ed in a light most favorable to defendant, would ~­
tainly permit the indulgence of the presumption of an in-
tent to deceive from the knowing concealment of the rna-
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terial facts heretofore mentioned. At this point, the bur-
den shifts . to plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that she had no such intent to deceive. The 
reco:vd (again viewed in a light most favorable to defend-
ant) certainly does not sustain plaintiff's burden of proof 
on this issue. Hence, another genuine issue of material fact 
is shown to exist , the resolution of whlch can be accomp-
lished only by a trial of this matter on its merits. 
To plaintiff's anticipated contention that the presump-
tion cannot be indulged because of insufficient evidence of 
concealment of material facts, a judicial definition of some 
of fue terminology used in the application would appear to 
support the contention that such concealment was done by 
plaintiff. It will be noted that in item seven of the appli-
cation, an affirmative answer was given to the question as 
to whether the proposed insured was in "good health". 
This term was defined in Braddock by Smith vs. Pacific 
Woodmen Life Association, 89 Utah 75, 54 P2d 1189 as 
follows: 
"The general rule appears to be that the tenn "good 
health" when used in a policy of life insurance means 
that the applicant has no grave, important or serious 
disease, and is free from any ailment that seriously 
affects the general soundness or healthfullness of the 
system." 
It is readily apparent from the testimony of plaintiff 
in he~r deposition that her deceased husband was not in 
"good health" as so defined at the time the application 
was signed by her, and it is likewise apparent that she 
knew that he was not in good health. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial coutt erred in granting plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The decision should be reversed and 
remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FORD R. PAULSON, for 
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